



WHEN THE DREAMS COME TRUE:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FREE
MOVEMENT OF TURKS WITHIN EU

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Abstract

Immigration into Europe has always been at the center of EU's agenda. With the candidacy of Turkey for entry into the EU, the issue of immigration is being discussed with a new intensity. That is why this paper aims to understand the dynamics that will govern Turkish migration into EU after membership and to provide a sound basis for its complicated nature. In order to do that, different theories of migration have been categorized at different levels of approaches and analyzed to understand the reasons for migration. To ground these theories in the reality of migration, the statistics on countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have been used. After identifying the reasons why citizens of these new member states migrate, prospective Turkish migration has been analyzed accordingly. It has been found out that the reasons for Turkish migration will be mostly the same as those for new member states' citizens. As a result of this, it has been concluded that the prospective Turkish migration will be extremely diverse and complicated and that the directions of migration will not only be from Turkey to Europe but also from Europe to Turkey.

Key words: Turkey, European Union, immigration, free movement of people, migration theories, labor migration, circular migration, lifestyle migration.

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List of Abbreviations

CEC: Commission of the European Communities

CEECs: Central and Eastern European Countries

EU2: Romania and Bulgaria

EU8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia

EU10: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus

EU12: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria

EU15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom

AT: Austria, **BE:** Belgium, **BG:** Bulgaria, **CY:** Cyprus, **CZ:** Czech Republic, **DE:** Germany, **DK:** Denmark, **EE:** Estonia, **EL:** Greece, **ES:** Spain, **FI:** Finland, **FR:** France, **HU:** Hungary, **IE:** Ireland, **IT:** Italy, **LT:** Lithuania, **LU:** Luxembourg, **LV:** Latvia, **MT:** Malta, **NL:** Nederland, **PL:** Poland, **PT:** Portugal, **RO:** Romania, **SE:** Sweden, **SI:** Slovenia, **SK:** Slovakia, **TR:** Turkey, **UK:** United Kingdom,

1 Introduction

Are Europeans afraid of Turks? The answer can be yes or no depending upon one's point of view. One widespread fear is that large numbers of Turks will immigrate to current EU member states when Turkey becomes a member of the EU. It is this fear that inspires this thesis. Such a fear is realistic but only to a certain extent. For example, after 2 years of EU expansion from 2004 to 2006, the migration from EU10 states to EU15 countries was modest on average (CEC, 2006a). But in the case of Turkey, although the number of migrants as a percentage of national population may turn out to be similar to that of the new members from 2004 to 2006, the total number of people who will be moving into other EU member states would be much larger due to the large population of Turkey. That is why the free movement of Turkish citizens within the EU after membership deserves attention. Before starting to analyze the prospective flow of citizens of Turkey into EU member states, a short discussion of Europe and Turkey in regards to the free movement of people is needed.

The four freedoms, namely the free movement of goods, capital, services and people, are the basis of European Union. However, the free movement of people is still restricted due to some regulations on labor mobility. All EU citizens are free to enter any EU member states but not all of them are allowed to work freely. This is mainly because of concerns about the sizable flow of people from Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). That is why EU member states may apply transitional rules on workers from EU-12 countries. Due to the better and abundant opportunities in EU-15 countries than in EU-12 countries, open borders for workers may threaten the local labor market of EU-15 countries.

Turkish citizens, for the present time, are not allowed to enter the EU or work there freely. However, there is a considerable population of Turkish people living in Europe. Most of these people came to Germany as guest workers after bilateral agreements from the 1950s to 1970s. Even though Germany originally

considered these guest workers to be temporary workers, many of them decided to stay permanently after Germany stopped inviting guest workers due to the economic fluctuations of the 1970s (Schaefer, Austin & Parker, 2005). The biggest migration from Turkey to Europe occurred between 1950 and 1980. This movement was not free but relied upon bilateral agreements.

The Purpose of the Study

Since the movement of the Turkish labor force was restricted by bilateral agreements, any prospective movement of citizens of Turkey would be more important due to free movement of people for EU citizens. That is why considering this fact; this paper aims to determine key dynamics and factors of migration within the EU. After determining the factors, I will draw conclusions for the free movement of Turks within the EU after full membership. For the conclusions, it is assumed that there will be no restrictions on movement of people who would like both to stay and to work in the EU since the impact of transitional rules is rather limited in the long-run. However the impacts of transitional rules on labor mobility are analyzed shortly because transitional rules are still in force for some of newer EU members.

The Approach

In order to find the key factors which affect the phenomenon of intra-EU migration, I will use three different levels to categorize different theoretical perspectives in order to understand this phenomenon. After discussing migration within the EU in this theoretical framework, I will analyze the impact of past expansions on the flow of people within EU. The theoretical analysis will combine three approaches. Firstly, migration phenomenon is analyzed in three levels namely micro, meso and macro levels at which reasons for migration are categorized. Secondly, the reasons for migration are analyzed by referencing the theories of migration, and finally reasons for migration are considered as pull and push factors. In this paper, the different theories of migration will be categorized in micro, meso and macro levels according to their scope of interest

and push and pull factors will be addressed while analyzing different theories of migration when necessary.

To combine the theoretical and practical levels, I will benefit from statistics. By using the statistics I will relate the factors defined in theoretical discussion to the reality of today's migration patterns within the EU. Once I have established this relationship, I will use my analysis to understand the pattern of prospective migration from Turkey to EU member states after Turkey becomes a member of the EU. However I will not make use of projections, mainly because the future is unpredictable. For example, the studies done before 2004 on projecting the prospective migration flow from CEECs to EU-15 countries did not take the current economic crisis into account. Moreover, I will not discuss the impact of cultural differences between Turkey and Europe on migrants' decision to move, since these differences are subjective. In this paper I will not give numbers but a critical, objective and scientific ground for further discussions and negotiations on Turkish membership, with an emphasis on the heterogeneous nature of migration. My goal is to mediate the overstatements of European politicians on one hand, and the underestimation of Turkish politicians on the other hand, of the possible negative impacts of Turkish membership, concerning free movement of people.

2 Theories of Migration

Theories about migration are generally conceptualized according to the reasons as well as empirical examples of migration. There are many different methods to analyze it. In this diversity of theories it is nearly impossible to find one single comprehensive theory of migration. This is mainly because every single region to which people immigrate to and from which emigrate exists under its unique conditions and each researcher's understanding and interpretation of these conditions varies according to their backgrounds. Moreover not only are the dynamics of international and internal migration different, but migration within Europe is much more complex. European culture is extremely diverse for a relatively small land mass, despite the common values such as freedom and democracy. From a national perspective, Intra-EU can be considered as international migration while from an EU perspective it can be considered internal migration, since the international migration laws do not apply for EU citizens who are free to move within EU territory.

Since there are various reasons why people migrate, it is hard to cover all types of migration at all levels of abstraction. That is to say, on a high level of abstraction, a comprehensive theory may not be useful to understand the diverse nature of migration. That is why in this paper, different theories will be used to explain the reasons for migration from three levels of approach namely micro, meso and macro approaches.

As can be seen in Table 1, the micro level focuses on individual preferences that help migrants to decide on a destination that gives them the desired living conditions according to their values and expectancies. In this level individual autonomy is crucial, because the movement of people is dependent upon their opportunities and resources. Factors such as availability of employer organizations, political conditions and legal system of the destination country are some of the important parameters that affect the choice of the free

mover. In addition, family and kinship ties help to determine the choices of destination.

On the meso level, symbolic and social ties within migrant communities are important for movers even though these ties can differ much. Through these ties, migrants make use of the resources of others who have already migrated, and also of the solidarity between different migrants who have the same origin.

On the macro level, structural conditions such as unemployment rate, wages, living standards, working conditions, political stability, career opportunities etc. which determine the direction and flow of migration are at the centre of interest. From this point of view, the importance of economic, social and political conditions is stressed.

Table 1. Three Levels of Migration Analysis

MICRO values or desires and expectancies	MESO collectives and social networks	MACRO Macro-level opportunity Structures
Individual values and expectancies - improving and securing survival, wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, autonomy, affiliation, and morality	Social ties - strong ties: families and households - weak ties: network of potential movers, brokers, and stayers; Symbolic ties: Kin, ethnic, national, political, religious organizations; symbolic communities Content of ties – transactions Obligations, reciprocity, and solidarity; Information, control, and access to resources of others	Economics - income and unemployment differentials Politics - regulation of spatial mobility through nation- states and international regimes - political repression, ethnic, national, and religious conflicts Cultural setting - dominant norms and discourses Demography and ecology - population growth; - availability of arable land - level of technology
Source: Faist, 2000.		

It should be noted that Table 1 deals with international migration and some of the factors described are not always useful to understand migration within European Union. The whole table is kept in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the factors involved in migration. Not all of these factors play a role in intra-EU migration, though it is still very complicated. For example, political repression is not an important factor in the migration of EU citizens, even though a limited number of people can still suffer from it. That is why some of the factors defined in each level will not be explained in detail.

The Micro Level Approach

There are two theories that belong to the micro level group: Neo-classical¹ and human capital theory.

Neo-classical theory assumes that every individual acts in an economically rational way. The decision to move is based on the possibility for a person to raise his/her living standard by migration. From this point of view, wage differentials between two regions are the main reason for migration. As Bauer and Zimmermann (1999, p.22) said, "Migration mainly occurs because of geographical differences in the demand and supply of labor markets. Regions with a shortage of labor relative to capital are characterized by a high equilibrium wage, whereas regions with a large supply of labor relative to capital are faced with low equilibrium wages. This wage differential causes a migration flow from low wage to high wage regions". However, people are free to choose to immigrate into high wage regions. According to this theory, factor prices between two countries are determinant. For example, a developing country with a high number of unskilled workers and relatively low wages will face emigration when this country starts to have free trade and open borders with a developed country where skilled workers are abundant and the wages of unskilled workers are relatively higher than the wages of unskilled workers in the developing country. According to neo-classical theory, as a result of this migration, the wages of unskilled workers in the destination country will decrease due to the higher number of unskilled workers coming from the developing country. Conversely the wages of skilled workers in the origin country will increase as a result of the increased immigration of well-educated people to the more developed country. In the long term the factor prices for both types of workers will be equalized and the migration flow resulting from wage differentials will come to an end.

¹ The neo-classical theory shall be explored more in the section of Macro Level below.

In the work of Harris and Todaro (See Riadh 1998, p.3 and Bauer and Zimmermann 1999, p.23), an extended version of this approach was developed, which says that the flow of migration from rural to urban areas also occurs due to the possibility of finding jobs even though such a migration flow increases unemployment in the destination country. This does not, however, change the basic assumption of the neo-classical approach (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999). The higher wages available in the receiving country have a pulling effect, and people make a personal decision to migrate in order to benefit from these high wages as economically rational individuals.

However, such a theory has its shortcomings too. Purchasing power of individuals or households is one of them. Even though one can earn more in the receiving country than in the sending country, the purchasing power of the migrant can be lower in the destination country than in the country of origin. This is mainly because of the differences in the costs of living between two regions. Another point is that it is hard to determine how migrants' socio-cultural background influences their decision of migration. That is to say, the psychological and social costs of moving are not considered in this approach. Higher wages may not compensate for the psychological and social costs of moving, such as leaving family or friends, which means that the wage differentials themselves do not necessarily cause migration.

To sum up, "In this type of model that focuses completely on labor markets, wage differentials measured in terms of observed wage rates at origin and at destination are the main explanatory variables" (CEC, 2000, p.3). Considering the people only as economically rational individuals are not sufficient to explain the driving force behind the migration. Since there are other factors that influence the flow of migration, wage differentials can be considered a pre-condition for migration.

Human capital theory, the second micro-level theory, stresses the importance of individual preferences regarding migration. According to this theory, people choose to migrate in order to invest so that they can increase their capabilities

and eventually their income. However, “increasing capabilities” does not necessarily refer to obtaining official papers that prove higher and better educational levels. It is also related to life experiences, which are impossible to measure officially. For example life experiences can increase the adaptability and competitiveness of people and therefore increase their income. From this point of view, human capital theory is also strongly related to life-styles of individuals. Similarly, higher income opportunities in destination countries are not sufficient to explain the reason for migration since within a country people’s choices differ greatly depending upon their socio-cultural characteristics. That is to say, individual opinions of the receiving countries are diverse, and tend to depend upon people’s age, gender and schooling (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999).

For instance, highly educated people tend to migrate more often than other groups, since the risks of migration such as communication problems with locals, adapting the local life are less. As a result of the knowledge they have gained through their education, highly educated migrants are armed with more ambition and a more expansive view of their possibilities in a new country. Moreover, “... migration is an activity primarily of the young. The young are most likely to move ... [for various reasons such as economic opportunities, longer time for gains and less tied to current location]” (Walker, no date).

However, the factors described by human capital theory can provide only partial and implicit explanations for the migration patterns of the young and highly educated people. For example, highly educated people can easily find high wage jobs in almost any part of the world, but a highly educated individual can still prefer to move into a specific country simply because of a particular and personal interest. Moreover, it is necessary to make a distinction between different highly educated people according to their fields of work, study and specialization. A highly educated lawyer in a country is unlikely to find a job in other parts of the world, because laws are country-specific. A highly educated engineer, however, is more likely to find jobs in other countries since

engineering principles are the same globally. Another important point is that a highly educated person does not necessarily migrate into another country to do a high quality job. In contrast, some of them may have jobs that do not require high education, such as taxi driving. The reason for this might be the will to earn some money or to leave the country of origin.

To sum up, human capital theory stresses the individual character of decision-making on migration, and makes the assumption that migrants move with the goal of investing in their personal capabilities. Because various people are attracted to certain regions for their own reasons, pulling factors are more dominant than pushing factors in the context of human capital theory.

In the micro level approach, individuals are supposed to be rational actors seeking a place where they can get better life or achieve their life dreams.

2.1 The Meso Level Approach

Family and network migration are described by theories on the meso level, which focuses on ties, collectives and social networks.

In the case of family migration, decisions about migration are made in the family or household. Women's participation in the labor force changes the rates of migration since calculations dealing with family or household income are made depending upon whether one's income in the destination country can compensate for the losses in the country of origin.

As Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) put it, families tend to diversify their income by sending one of the family members to a foreign country to work, so that the family can overcome any problems that may occur in the labor market of the country of origin. This seems to explain the reason why people migrate in the absence of wage differentials. However, such an approach is more likely to be a piecemeal solution resulting from migration rather than a reason to migrate, since it is hard to believe that a family would send one of the members to

another region just to eliminate the risks that may occur in the local labor market. In contrast, a household is more likely to send one of the family members to increase their income and improve their living conditions in their country of origin. In the event of job loss in the country of origin, the family at home may end up entirely dependent on their family member working in another labor market, rather than using the migrant family member's contributions as a supplementary income. One good example of this effect is the history of Turkish migrants working in Germany sending some of their savings during the economic fluctuations in Turkey in the 1970s.

Another type of meso level approach is the theory of network migration. In this type of migration, social and information networks are crucial, since they decrease the risks inherent in migration. While the first migrants from a certain community face the most difficulties in social and monetary terms, their successors can make use of the experiences of the first migrants. Once such a network is established, the risk associated with migration to a foreign country is lowered, which in turn increases the migration to this destination country (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999).

However, a pattern of network migration cannot continue indefinitely since the net return of moving to another country decreases as the wages decrease in the receiving country due to higher numbers of people who have migrated. Moreover, this type of network migration can be interrupted by strict rules and regulation. For example Bulgarians and Romanians tend to immigrate to southern European countries due to these transitional rules applied by Germany. However such a fact does not change the basic assumptions of network migration.

In conclusion, the meso level approach pays attention to individuals' social ties in the decision of migration and how these ties influence the decision to move. The existence of a certain amount of people from the same origin country and of family members specifically in the receiving country is of crucial importance for the direction and density of migration.

2.2 The Macro Level Approach

In this level, the neo-classical theory shall be reanalyzed, based upon the assumption that people are pushed to migrate due to structural conditions which negatively impact the well-being of individuals or families. In this case, the decision to migration is not independent choice made by rational individuals, but necessary.

In developing countries, low-skilled workers earn much less than they would in a developed country. The costs of living can be extremely high for these workers relative to their low wages, making it very difficult to earn a living. In such conditions, people are pushed to migrate since they have no other choice but to try and earn their living elsewhere. In other words, unacceptable living conditions push individuals to migrate. From this point of view, neo-classical theory can be used as a tool to understand individuals' behavior in the macro level.

Moreover, aggregate supply and demand is also an important macro factor that has an impact on the flow of migration. This approach can also be used to understand the push and pull factors involved in migration.

In this theory, it is assumed that there are some negative factors or conditions in the country of origin that push people away and some positive ones that pull people to the receiving country.

In order to explain this, an analysis of how the flow of people affects aggregate supply and demand in the receiving country is provided. Briefly put, an increase in aggregate demand will increase the price of goods as well as wages, and making a country more attractive for immigrants. One of the reasonable ways to stop inflation as a result of increasing prices and wages is immigration which will prevent further increase in prices and also will sustain the supply of labor. However, a description solely based on aggregate demand and supply can be vague because there is a great variety of factors that push and pull people. That

is to say, supply and demand of labor in the receiving country may have different impacts depending upon various factors such as the educational levels of immigrants, or union wages. To elaborate more, the immigration of high-qualified workers may have a pull effect on high-tech industries, which increases both productivity and production. This, in turn, increases the demand for labor and decreases the unemployment rate as well as migrants' dependency on welfare benefits (Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2009). As discussed in the micro level analysis, it is important to distinguish between high qualified workers whose fields of work, interests, and goals are different. Another important point is the impact of union wages which can have a major impact on unemployment. Considering that strong unions are common in the EU member states, decreasing union wages could allow more people to be employed. Keeping the same level of wages through the phases of immigration will increase unemployment since immigrants will not be able to be employed and also as a result of increasing dependency of migrants on welfare benefits, the taxes might be higher, which would certainly put budgetary pressures on native workers (Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2009). Increasing taxes may require increases in wages again. However, there are some other factors that have been discussed in micro level analysis that might increase this dependency. The works of Borjas and Brücker (see Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann 2009, p.8) are interesting in the sense that culture shock, discrimination; legislative and institutional regulations may negatively affect the performance and productivity of immigrants which in turn discourages or hinders them from working and therefore makes them more welfare benefit-dependent.

Another important point about the labor market in the receiving country is the problem of asymmetric information about migrant workers' true skills. In the previous theories, the assumption is that employers have the correct information about the migrants; however, considering asymmetric information, results derived from the theories may change. The employers find it efficient to pay average wages for all the low-skilled migrant workers without considering the differences between their productivity and performance. That's why in the case

of asymmetric information high-skilled workers tend to migrate more since they are more likely to get their true wages because it is relatively easy for them to prove their skills. Nevertheless, employers in the destination country, in the long run, can evaluate the true performance and productivity of the low skilled workers as well as the fact that employers can also gather sufficient information about the prospective migrants so that their wages can be determined according to their true skills. Apart from what employers can do to determine the true wages of low skilled workers, workers themselves can also provide certificates to prove their true skills (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999).

Consequently, such an approach is not able to provide clear results to understand the underlying reasons for labor migration, since with asymmetric information; labor migration partially depends upon points such as what stimulates migration of workers having different levels of skills, and how capable the workers are to prove their skills (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999).

The macro level approach considers the structural conditions as a factor that pushes people to migrate and these structural conditions are pre-conditions for migration.

In conclusion, theories of migration stress quite different points and it is indeed very hard to decide on a comprehensive theory. To clearly identify the reasons of migration is thus complicated because there are plenty of reasons that influence the decisions of the migrant worker. That is why the prospective migration flow from/to Turkey to/from current EU member states in the case of Turkish membership shall be analyzed by considering the complicated nature of migration.

3 Types of Migration

I have divided migration into three categories namely labor, circular and lifestyle migration that shall be analyzed in this paper in order to draw conclusions on the impact on migration flows of Turkish membership². Labor migration refers to movement of the working age population. Circular migration can be considered as labor migration, but circular migration does not often result in permanent residence, which is why it has different impacts on receiving and sending countries and in this sense a distinction between circular and labor migration is made. Lastly, even though life style migration is not age-specific, in this paper lifestyle migration is about the movement of elderly people within the EU to get a desired way of life into their older ages.

However, it is hard to get the empirical evidence on eastern enlargement including Malta and Cyprus and the membership of Bulgaria and Romania since there is a lack of full data on migrants and the available data is being continuously updated (Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2009). Moreover with the membership of 12 countries in the last 6 years, people that are already illegally in EU15 are also registered and indeed it has a pure statistical effect. In addition, the number of immigrants who left the receiving country is not recorded. Lastly, the distinction between foreign-born and foreign citizens is not made which makes it difficult to measure the net immigration after the last two enlargement rounds. Nonetheless it is still possible to draw some conclusions from the experience of last two enlargements depending upon available data.

² It is possible to divide migration into more (or less) categories but in this paper this categorization is used due its compatibility with the theories of migration used.

3.1 Migration in the EU

Germany had always been a main destination for CEECs before the enlargement in 2004. However, due to slow economic growth early in the last decade and transitional arrangements (see Table 2) for the free movement of workers, the direction of flow of people from EU8³ changed to the UK and Ireland and from the EU2⁴ into Spain and Italy (European Integration Consortium, 2009). Since many citizens of CEECs as well as Turkish citizens have immigrated to Germany mainly as guest workers according to specific bilateral agreements between Germany and the sending countries, all of these migrant workers created their own social networks and ways of life in a foreign country. However, with the last two enlargement rounds, transitional arrangements have become more deterministic on the people's choice of migration more than these social networks which are considered to be one of the most important factors that influence the direction of flow of migration. However it should be realized that people find ways to bypass these transitional rules. But their impact is hard to determine due to its illegal character.

³ EU8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

⁴ EU2: Romania and Bulgaria

Table 2. Transitional Provisions (as of 1 May 2009)

Member State	Workers from the EU-8/EU-15	Workers from BG and RO/EU-25	
EU-15	Belgium	Free access (1 May 2009)	Restrictions with simplifications
	Denmark	Free access (1 May 2009)	Free access (1 May 2009)
	Germany	Restrictions with simplifications *	Restrictions with simplifications *
	Ireland	Free access (1 May 2004)	Restrictions
	Greece	Free access (1 May 2006)	Free access (1 January 2009)
	Spain	Free access (1 May 2006)	Free access (1 January 2009)
	France	Free access (1 July 2008)	Restrictions with simplifications
	Italy	Free access (27 July 2006)	Restrictions with simplifications
	Luxembourg	Free access (1 November 2007)	Restrictions with simplifications
	Netherlands	Free access (1 May 2007)	Restrictions with simplifications
	Austria	Restrictions with simplifications*	Restrictions with simplifications*
	Portugal	Free access (1 May 2006)	Free access (1 January 2009)
	Finland	Free access (1 May 2006)	Free access (1 January 2007)
	Sweden	Free access (1 May 2004)	Free access (1 January 2007)
United Kingdom	Access - mandatory workers registration scheme (1 May 2004)	Restrictions with simplifications	
EU-10	Czech Republic	No reciprocal measures	Free access - national law (1 January 2007)
	Cyprus	-	Free access (1 January 2007)
	Estonia	No reciprocal measures	Free access (1 January 2007)
	Latvia	No reciprocal measures	Free access (1 January 2007)
	Lithuania	No reciprocal measures	Free access (1 January 2007)
	Hungary	No reciprocal measures (1 January 2009)	Free access (1 January 2009)
	Malta	-	Restrictions
	Poland	No reciprocal measures (17 January 2007)	Free access (1 January 2007)
	Slovenia	No reciprocal measures (25 May 2006)	Free access (1 January 2007)
Slovakia	No reciprocal measures	Free access (1 January 2007)	
EU-2	Bulgaria	-	No reciprocal measures
	Romania	-	No reciprocal measures

*Restrictions also on the posting workers in certain sectors. Source: CEC, 2008a.

What is new with the last two enlargements is that countries are free to apply their own transition policy regarding new members; while for citizens of Greece, Spain and Portugal six-year transitional arrangements were in force at the EU level after these countries became member states during the 80s. This means that each member state is allowed to analyze its own labor market and decide

about the regulations on labor mobility. These rules can be in force up to 7 years and each member state can reevaluate the labor market conditions and change the rules firstly after 2 years and secondly after 5 years and finally after 7 years no member state can restrict the free movement of workers within EU. Even though the restrictions for the citizens of EU12 countries cause migration from Eastern Europe to USA, decisions on labor mobility at the national level is an experience leading to more openness when compared to the EU level decisions regarding free movement of labor force in the 1980s when Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EU.

Even though the aim of this paper is to discuss the likely consequences of Turkey's accession regarding free movement of people as mentioned above, the transitional arrangements and the transition period which can be up to seven years is still of importance considering the fact that Turkish low-skilled workers shall go to European countries other than Germany and Austria assuming that Germany and Austria will apply transitional rules for Turkish workers , which is, in turn, likely to lead to new social networks in other EU member states as in Germany and Austria for years.


In conclusion, transitional rules have at least a short-term impact on the distribution of immigrants on the European territory while it is unlikely to know the full impact of these transitional rules on the size of migration.

People's Perception

The factors for migration discussed at the theoretical level also comes into the picture with the Euro barometer surveys about people's perception on moving into another EU member state. The Euro Barometer surveys what people think about moving into another EU member state relating to the theoretical factors to people's perceptions and understandings. What has been identified as factors of migration are wage differentials, family ties, social networks and individual preferences. People living in EU member states think that higher household income encourages them to move into another member states (see Fig. 1) while

being away from family and friends are the most discouraging factors (see Fig. 2). Moreover, if they wanted to move, the lack of language skills would be the most difficult issue to overcome for them (CEEC, 2008b).

Figure 1. Factors which might encourage someone to move to another country⁵



As seen in the Figure 1 higher incomes are very important for intra EU-movers. However there are some differences between the EU12 and EU15 understanding and expectations. For EU15 countries better working conditions are almost as important as higher incomes. The level of importance of better health-care facilities for EU12 respondents is two times as important as for EU15 respondents. These differences can be explained by the inadequate social services, lower wages, and worse living conditions in EU12 countries. However, higher household incomes do not necessarily mean higher purchasing

⁵ "Other" includes the factors whose scores are lower than 9% for both respondents and therefore insignificant for the analysis: Better support from family and friends, Access to better school system, Don't know, Shorter commuting time, To have access to better public transport.


power because higher costs of living in EU15 countries may make it hard for EU12 movers to attain the desired conditions. However it is important to stress that even though the low-skilled workers have the same purchasing power in the receiving country as in the country of origin, they will be poor in better conditions. For example assuming that a migrant can only meet the basic needs in the receiving country just as in the country of origin, but the migrant shall enjoy easier access to public services and aid, faster and more reliable transportation modes, better housing etc. Opportunity to get higher incomes for EU12 citizens is much more important than EU15 citizens and higher household income encourages EU12 citizens more. Finally one of the most striking results of Figure 1 is that more than 20% of both respondents are not encouraged to move into another EU member state by any factor. In conclusion except for the factor of higher income and family and friends, the differences between EU12 and EU15 respondents refer to a difference in lifestyle. The concerns of EU15 respondents are about the climate since they already enjoy good working and housing conditions and health-care facilities while EU12 respondents do not care about better weather conditions since they suffer from bad working and housing conditions and bad health-care facilities in comparison to EU15 citizens. The concerns of EU12 respondents will also be valid for citizens of Turkey as well.

The most important factor for EU12 respondents, to have a higher household income, supports the micro level approach. In the micro level approach, getting a better life is the basis of the decision of migration and for EU12 respondents, getting a better lifestyle is strongly related to having higher income. The second most important factor for EU12 respondents, better working conditions may be related to structural conditions and thus to the macro level approach which assumes that bad conditions push individuals to migrate. However, since the high-income EU12 respondents are also included in the survey, it may be said that better working conditions can also be related to the micro level. The third most important factor for EU12 respondents, to be closer to family and friends,

refers to the meso level approach which pays attention to social ties of individuals.

While better health-care facilities encourage EU12 citizens, worse health-care facilities discourage EU15 citizens to move into another country (see Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Factors which might discourage someone from moving to another country⁶



Except health-care facilities, in comparison to the factors that encourage both EU15 and EU12 citizens, the factors that discourage all respondents bear almost the same importance.

The cultural proximity and social networks are still of importance considering the migration flow from Eastern European countries to Western European Countries (see Fig. 2). For both EU15 and EU12 respondents, language and family and friend ties are of crucial importance which indicates that the psychological and social costs of moving are also important. The results, indirectly, may show that

⁶ "Other" includes the factors whose scores are lower than 11% for both respondents and therefore insignificant for the analysis: None, Worse working environment and amenities, Don't know, Different school system, Longer commuting time or worse public transport.

the importance of family ties for both respondent groups may trigger migration into the countries where some of the family members have already immigrated. One of the most striking results of the survey is that accessing health care and social benefits is much less important for new member states than old member states which indicates that getting higher incomes is superior.

Migration Patterns


There is an important difference between locations where EU8 nationals have moved and locations where EU2 nationals (Romania and Bulgaria) have gone (see Fig. 3). The main destination for EU8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) citizens is the UK and Ireland mainly because there are no strict arrangements for workers in these two countries. Some other reasons why EU8 citizens prefer the UK and Ireland are the language and low cost flights (Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2009). However it should be noted that the richer people, say EU15 citizens, can fly home more than poorer people, say EU10 citizens. In this sense the distance is still of big importance. The work of Anderson (see Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2009) gives some ideas about language opportunity because many people from EU8 countries studied English at home and value the opportunity to use and improve it. Considering EU policies for competition for cheaper transportation, the distance has become less important with the low-cost flights. Finally legalization of illegal migrants in the UK and Ireland has also affected those numbers shown in the Figure 3.

In the case of the EU2, the main destination is Spain and Italy and linguistic similarity and networks are the main pull factors for EU2 nationals to immigrate to Spain and Italy. Considering the fact that lack of language skills is the most discouraging factor for those who would like to move into another EU member states, it is easier to understand Romanians' propensity to move into Spain and Italy where they can easily learn the local language due to the similarity between the Romanian, Spanish and Italian languages. It should be noted that there is no

similar EU language to the Turkish language⁷. But citizens of Turkey start to learn English in primary school and this may overcome the issue of absence of a similar language to Turkish in the EU. Moreover current Turkish minorities in some EU member states such as Germany still offer a language opportunity and this is rather related to network migration which will be elaborated later in this paper. Low-cost airlines are also important in this flow of migration, as per EU8 nationals. However it is important to point out that for Bulgaria the second main destination is Germany (15%) while for Romania the second one is Italy (around 25%). One of the reasons for this difference can be the social networks that some of the Bulgarian Turks, who could not return to Turkey with the big migration wave in 1989 and migrated into Germany, established (Smith & Eade, 2009). Also, it is likely that Bulgarian Turks benefit from the social networks that Turks who went to Germany as guest workers, have established. Regarding this, it is realistic to assume that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, those Turks who stayed in some EU member states that were once part of the Ottoman Empire such as Bulgaria and Greece, tend to move into some other member states such as Germany and Austria where there are already many Turks living, if they have been unable to come back to Turkey thus far. It should also be noted that non-EU27 citizens are the majority in almost all EU countries even though the dominant proportion of EU10 migrants are in Ireland and the biggest proportion of EU2 migrants are in Spain (CEC, 2008a).


⁷ The similarity between Uralic languages such as Finnish and Altaic languages such as Turkish is rather insignificant when compared to the big similarity between Romanian and Spanish and Italian.

Figure 3. Share of foreign nationals from new member states in the EU 15



Another important point to stress regarding the free movement of people within the EU territory is the fact that the population size of the EU12 influences the density of movement (see Fig. 4). More Polish and Romanian citizens move than any other new member state mainly because the population of these two countries is much larger than that of other new member states.

Figure 4. The propensity to migrate in EU, 2007




Even though the number of Romanian and Polish movers is much higher than other countries' citizens, the propensity index (P_i) shows that Lithuanians, Romanians and Slovaks are the three most mobile citizens in the EU. The Propensity index is the value obtained by dividing the share of national movers as a percentage of all EU intra-movers (age group 15-64) by the share of population of each country as a percentage of total EU population. If P_i is more than 1, then nationals of that country are more likely to move. As we can see from the P_i values, propensity to move for citizens of new member states is much higher than that for citizens of old member states. However it is interesting that the P_i value of Portugal is still much higher than that of the UK, France, Germany and Italy, which also indicates the importance of conditions within a single country i.e. lower level of economic development. The P_i values are not dependent upon whether a country has recently become a member state but the conditions in a country are more influential on migration within EU. Considering the relatively poorer conditions in Portugal than the UK, France, Germany and Italy, the P_i values make more sense. An important point about these figures is that the data is on the age group 15-64. People older than 64, are not included.

Considering the fact that retired people from developed member states tend to migrate to developing member states where living costs are lower because elderly migrants can have a better quality of life in cheaper places with pensions they get from their home country. Including this group of people may cause slight differences in the figures. This type of migration shall, however, be analyzed in another chapter.

There is, however, another point to be stressed carefully. How many years mobile EU citizens stay in the destination country, vastly, differs in different member states (see Fig. 5). The recent outflow from Lithuania and Romania are the two largest ones. Even though the data covers only the first 4 years after the enlargement, it is still possible to draw some conclusions from these figures. In the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and Italy which are also the founding members of the EU, the share of citizens who stay more than 4 years in another EU member state is around 70, 77, 63, 70 and 88% respectively. In contrast, in some of the new member states like Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the same share is around 31, 30 and 35% respectively. It is likely that citizens of new member states will start to stay longer in other EU member states in the long run. This is mainly because people from the EU12 countries will be more experienced when they move in and out from the EU15 countries and make their decisions according to it. Moreover, the market will regulate itself and set equilibrium in workforce mobility and the likelihood of EU12 citizens to move will converge to that of EU15.

Figure 5. Mobility rates by sending country – mobile EU citizens living in another EU member state by years of residence (age group 15-64), 2007 (in percentage of working age population of country of citizenship)



3.2 Labor Migration

Labor migration in the EU has many aspects as discussed in the “Theories of Migration” chapter. However, it is hard to analyze the migration from Eastern European countries to Western European countries in macro, mezo and micro levels separately because the factors in each level are interconnected and interdependent. Also, the interpretation of available data requires the combined understanding of aforementioned three theoretical levels.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the structural conditions within EU are determinant on the direction and density of migration. That’s why, as well as the social networks and family ties and individual preferences, the macroeconomic differences between Eastern European countries and Western European countries are also analyzed in order to understand the changing patterns of migration from earlier enlargement rounds.

Structural differences between countries may explain the direction of migration. As can be seen in the Figure 6, there is a big gap in purchasing power of western and eastern European countries. People from countries like Poland migrate to countries like UK not only because there are better conditions in destination countries but also because the conditions are worse in the countries of origin. This gap reflects both pushing and pulling factors in macro level and is very important to understand the direction of migration in order to efficiently assess prospective Turkish migration.

Figure 6. Gross Domestic Product per capita in Purchasing Power Parities




Figure 7 clearly shows the wage differentials between Eastern and Western European countries. In the countries where there are no minimum wages like Germany, the wages for elementary occupations in Germany are much higher than in Eastern European countries. Moreover, the wage differentials for high-skilled jobs are also big between these countries. Nonetheless, the difference between purchasing power of these countries is less but still big. For example the minimum wages in purchasing power standard in Romania and Ireland are around 220£ and 1150£ while the official minimum wages are 136£ and 1460£ respectively. This is mainly because the higher living costs in Ireland but the difference is still so big and supports the assumptions of neo-classical theory.

However, these macro-economic indicators alone are not able to determine the direction of migration because people also migrate into relatively poorer countries such as into Spain but not into Ireland or the UK for some other reasons. If the migrants are only considered as economically rational individuals as in the neo-classical theory then all the migrants should have migrated into the UK or Ireland and that is why it is impossible to explain the migration flow from Romania and Bulgaria into Spain and Italy. In order to better clarify the reasons for migration from EU8 and EU2, it is needed to analyze the recent migration flow into some European Countries.


Figure 7. Monthly Minimum Wages



To clearly support the macro factors that have impact on labor mobility, it is needed to analyze some other indicators. As put in macro level analysis, the structural conditions push people to immigrate into prosperous countries and all the data regarding the movement of people within EU territory has shown that there is an outflow from Eastern member states to western member states. This trend can be explained by the figures on GDP per capita, wage differentials as shown above but the unemployment rate is also very crucial to explain such a trend (see Fig. 8). After membership, the unemployment rates of Bulgaria, Romania and Poland have decreased dramatically while the unemployment

rates in Ireland, Spain and UK have slightly increased. This is not only due to economic development or decline but also to the movement of unemployed people. Similarly in the new member states employment growth increased after the enlargement and the employment growth rates have converged in comparison to pre-accession period. Nonetheless, it is needed to consider the structure of each member states' economy to assess these trends because such fluctuations in employment and unemployment might partially stem from the countries' own structural conditions.

Figure 8. Unemployment rates for selected member states



Another important result of outflow of citizens of new member states is that the inflationary pressures have been lessened in most of the receiving countries while in sending countries it results in temporary increases in inflation (CEC, 2008a). Even though it is realistic to claim that there is a lack of labor force in the sending countries, it is hard to say that it is only due to the outflow of people but also the rapid economic growth in sending countries especially the Baltic States and Poland (CEC, 2008a). Moreover, these figures do not give clear ideas about the preferences and educational levels of individuals. As discussed earlier, the reasons for migration are diverse and analyzing macro factors are


not sufficient to identify the dynamics and results of migration stemming from CEECs.

Migrant Stocks

Migrant stocks in any country undoubtedly stimulate further immigration through social networks. For example as well as the transitional rules that citizens of new member states have to obey, social networks have also influenced the migration flow after 2004. Polish people who had already immigrated to the UK before the enlargement has stimulated further immigration from Poland to the UK at a much faster pace (see Fig. 9). It is significant to observe how the number of Polish people dramatically increased after the enlargement. Even though some other people from Bulgaria and Hungary also immigrated to the UK, the growth rate of migrant stock from Poland is much higher than the other two. However, it is still hard to say that all of these migrants will stay in the UK permanently, because 20% of the Polish people who have immigrated to the UK are seasonal workers and around 30% of them are willing to stay less than 2 years (CEC, 2008b). Depending upon these figures, it is hard to estimate the real net flow of people since there is no system to record returns, which is why it is hard to assess the real impact of the outflow of people from CEECs.


Another important point is the number of Turkish people moving to the UK even though there are more restrictions for Turkish migrants. In 2004, there were more Turkish people than Polish people and with the membership of Poland the number of Polish people dramatically increased. That's why it is likely that the stock of Turkish people may influence the rate of migration from Turkey into the UK in the case of Turkish membership. As it can be seen in the figures, even though the growth rate of Hungarian people is at 50%, the total number of Hungarian people in 2008 is still much lower than the number of Turkish and Polish people in 2000. It can be deduced that the larger the population the larger the number of migrants after enlargement considering the positive contribution of social ties to migration.

Figure 9. Migrant stock in UK and Germany (in one hundred thousands)



Source: European Integration Consortium, 2009.

Figure 10. Migrant stock growth rate in UK and Germany



In Germany, however, the percentage of migrant stock from the EU8 and the EU2 decreased dramatically from 2000 to 2007, from 58 percent to 30 percent and from 46 percent to 10 percent respectively. This is mainly because of the transitional rules applied to EU10 citizens. However, this decrease in the share of EU10 migrant stock does not mean that the number of EU10 citizens has decreased in contrast it has increased but many of the citizens of new member states after 2004 migrated into Ireland, the UK, Spain and Italy. That's why


Germany has lost its role as being the main destination for CEECs citizens. In addition to transitional rules, the slow economic growth and high unemployment rates in Germany have contributed to this trend too. It should be noted that the growth rate of Polish migrants in Germany is higher than the other EU2 and the average of the EU8 (European Integration Consortium, 2009). And also the growth rate of migrant stock of the EU8 and the EU2 in Germany has increased despite the transitional rules. This can also be explained as the social networks that have been established by the first comers. However, it is hard to claim that after the removal of transitional rules in 2011 for the EU10 and in 2014 for the EU2 at latest, people will still be moving into the UK, Ireland, Spain and Italy at the same pace as today because the existing social networks in Germany may change the direction of flow to Germany and make Germany the main destination for EU12 citizens again.

Moreover, the decrease in the number of Turkish immigrants is the result of naturalization and return migration.

So far, in this section, the importance of networks and family ties has been stressed. However, to look into data of individual countries on immigration proves that migrant stock is not the only reason for the trends shown in the example of the UK and Germany. If we consider the largest new member state, Poland, then the reasons why the number of Poles in some specific countries like Ireland and the UK increased cannot be explained by existing social networks (see Fig. 11). As seen in the figure 11, in 2000 the stock of residents of Poland in Italy and Spain and the UK is almost the same; however the increase of Poles in the UK is much higher than in Italy and Spain in total. As discussed in previous sections, at the meso level, social networks and family ties are of crucial importance but in this case there are some other factors as well as meso factors. Only existing migrant stock is not able to explain this trend. The same is valid for the Ireland case. Even though there were almost no Poles in Ireland in 2003, the number of Poles increased dramatically after 2003. While the smooth increase in Germany can be explained by transitional rules, it is impossible to

explain the low level of increases in Sweden where Poles are free to access the labor market as in Ireland, Spain and Italy. The reasons why Poles move into the UK and Ireland are diverse. At the meso level the networks and family ties are of still importance especially for the UK. At the macro level, structural conditions like wage differentials, unemployment etc. impact this trend and at the micro level, the fresh opportunities for Poles in the UK and Ireland, the will to improve language skills, dreams of young people are influential on Poles' decision on moving into Ireland and the UK.

Figure 11. Stocks of residents of Poland staying abroad for longer than 2 months in selected countries, in thousands



Source: Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2008. Figure 2.8


In conclusion, a dramatic increase in the number of citizens of one of CEECs does not necessarily result only from social networks. It is likely that social networks are more influential on the decision of individuals to move into a specific old member state provided that there are a certain number of people

living in the destination country. However, this number is also related to the concentration of immigrants too.

Remittance Flows

Another important point for meso level analysis is the workers' remittances which are crucial for driving the economy of developing countries and for the workers' family members who suffer from poverty or insufficient financial resources in the sending country (see Fig. 12). The figures show that the inward remittance flow of workers of new member states except for Portugal constitutes the highest shares of their GDPs. In addition Poland and Romania are the main recipients among CEECs. The figures strongly support that income of migrants working in another country are still of importance for the workers' family members living in the country of origin where there is a lack of job opportunities since there are still many people who survive depending upon the money that the migrants send back. This phenomenon can also be observed by analyzing the difference between inward and outward workers' remittances. In the main destination countries like Germany, Spain, and Ireland the volume of remittances coming to these countries is lower than the volume of the remittances going from them. This case may stem from the large number of immigrants working and sending home money to help their families. For the UK, even though the inward workers' remittances are higher than outward workers' remittances, the difference is much lower than new member states. In addition, the country's macro conditions are also influential on the volume of workers' remittances. However it should be noted that compensation of employees working in transnational companies influence the data presented even though those employees work in their country of origin, for example for Poland and Lithuania migrants' remittances (globally) are between 60 to 90 percent of total sum of remittances (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2008).


Figure 12. Workers' remittances and the difference between inward and outward remittances as a share of GDP (%)



For example, the inward workers' remittance for Turkey is quite high, in 2000 when Turkey suffered from economic fluctuations and political instability. And with political stability and rapid economic growth, household incomes increased and the volume of inward workers' remittances decreased from \$4.5 bn in 2000 to \$1.1 bn in 2006 (World Bank, 2008). However, in the early years of last decade, there was an economic decline in many parts of the world. That is why

it is hard to determine to what extent the conditions in Turkey had an impact on the higher amount of inward remittances in 2000. Another important point regarding this big shift in inward remittances can be the economic stagnation and increasing unemployment during the last decade in Germany. Due to these worsening conditions, Turks living in Germany might not earn enough to transfer money back to Turkey because the unemployment rate of Turkish people living in Germany increased dramatically between 2000 and 2006 (see Fig. 13).

Figure 13. Unemployment rate and increase in unemployment rate between 2000 and 2006 by percentage points



As seen in the Figure 13, migrants are more vulnerable to economic fluctuations than the natives. Unemployment rates of migrants are much higher than the natives and the total. And in case of an increase in unemployment, the unemployment rate of migrants rises faster than the natives and the average. It is realistic to conclude that this dramatic increase in the unemployment rate of Turkish migrants had an impact on the volume of inward remittances to Turkey. Even though the numbers represent the remittances from Turks all over the world, the largest Turkish population lives in Germany.

Consequently, the family ties of immigrants are strong and this increases the probability that more people might migrate by using these social networks and family ties. Family ties and social networks are crucial to understand the migration from Eastern European countries to Western European countries. The psychological and social costs of moving is of importance for most of the Europeans and to be away from family and friends discourages people to move into another country. However this also means that when people have friends or family members in another country, they are more likely to move due to the same reason. This relation has also been proven by the rates of change in migrant stock after the enlargement. Polish people prefer moving into the UK and Germany where there are already Polish people living.

So far the structural conditions and social networks and family ties have been at the center of interest. Individual preferences are, however, as important as macro and meso factors since without analyzing individual preferences it is, for instance, hard to understand why the citizens of the same country have immigrated to different countries having the same level of economic development.

Whatever the reason for migration is, free will always plays a crucial role in the decision of migration. Regarding the importance of free will and preferences of people, structural differences between sending and receiving countries, established social networks and family ties can also be considered as pre-conditions for migration since eventually it is that particular person who has chosen to move into another country. That is why it is important to analyze some other characteristics of current migration from new member states to old member states from this point of view.

3.3 Circular Migration

Circular migration generally refers to a broader phenomenon but in this paper a restricted definition of circular migration will be elaborated due to the lack of data and peculiar characteristics of intra-EU migration which is also the main target of the paper. Circular migration in this paper refers to seasonal or periodic migration⁸ for work and as a life-cycle process as is often the case of students. There are four patterns of circular migration:

- a- the permanent return of permanent migrants;
- b- the temporary return of permanent migrants;
- c- the permanent return of temporary migrants;
- d- the temporary return of temporary migrants (Newland, 2009).

The a-migrants refer to those who have, for a longer period time, lived in or have a citizenship from another EU member states and permanently move into their country of origin. This type of migration partially refers to labor migration discussed in the previous chapter. However this type will also be further elaborated in the next chapter. These types of migrants are so important in the sense that they generally bring their experiences to their home country and play a crucial role in driving the economy of their home country as AnnaLee Saxenian explains it in her book “The New Argonauts”. The b-migrants are those who hold citizenship of an EU member state and can freely enter their home countries. These migrants have to stay up to a certain amount of time in their home countries not to lose their permanent rights of residency in their adopted countries. However this pattern of migration is out of interest of this paper due to the free movement of people within the EU territory. The c-migrants refer to movers who have decided to stay in another EU member state for a certain amount of time. The d-migrants are temporary workers which are the main subject of this chapter. However it should be noted that it is hard to know that

⁸ Since the term 'seasonal migration' refers to agriculture generally, the term 'periodic migration' will be used in order to cover other sectors such as construction.

someone will move into another country permanently or not. That is to say, one may decide to move into another country, say, for one year but can stay there during a whole life-time or similarly someone may move into another country thinking about staying for a life-time but may come back after some time depending upon various reasons. That is why the categories defined as patterns of periodic migration are not always useful to calculate the number of people belonging to each category. So as to say, it cannot be known whether someone has moved into the country of origin permanently. However, there are some informative works about the temporary return of temporary migrants.

The Germany-Poland case is the mostly studied one among periodic migration studies in Europe. Even though the characteristics of periodic migration from/to other countries may vary, the dynamics are the same to some extent.

Since the periodic migration from Poland to Germany used to occur before Poland became a member state in 2004, it was thought that this type of migration will replace permanent migration with the accession of Poland to the European Union. However, even though structural differences play a crucial role, the reasons for periodic migration are different than any other patterns of migration. So as to say, in this type of migration, breadwinners' separation from the family is a very important factor and curtails the duration of the migration (Stark & Simon Fan, 2006). Moreover, earning in Germany and spending in a Polish village is a very good way for a Polish breadwinner to increase well-being of the family considering the strong altruism towards the family. One of the biggest differences between periodic and permanent migration is that periodic migration does not have an impact on unemployment in the sending country and may even increase the unemployment even though if unemployed people find temporary jobs in the destination country, *ceteris paribus* (all other things remaining constant), the unemployment will decrease in the country of origin. However the work of Fihel (see Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2008, p. 58) is very interesting in the sense that "... the seasonal [periodic] migration does not lead to any status change on the Polish labor market ... Seasonal [periodic] migration

can increase the unemployment and lead to staying out of the labor force in Poland.” The reasons for this are diverse according to the writers. Firstly, cost-benefit factors are very important. Relatively higher incomes may increase the intensity of temporary work as neo-classical theory conceptualizes by using the wage differentials. Secondly; most of the Polish migrants working seasonally are employed in the agricultural sector which does not require high qualifications. And often such migration does not increase the human capital of migrants and surprisingly the number of temporary migrants with a regular job is almost the same as those without a regular job (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2008). This indicates that reasons to migrate that have been defined by human capital theory in the micro level and are not valid for periodic migration. However Kaczmarczyk and Okólski mainly focus on periodic migrants working in the agricultural sector while there is a considerable amount of people working in the construction sector too. Another shortcoming of their work is that they do not clarify what type of work migrants with a regular job do in Poland. For example, teachers may work in the construction sector in another member state such as Germany during the summer holiday. According to the Eurostat database the average annual earnings of somebody working in the education sector or in the construction sector is around 10.000€ which means 1700€ for 2 months in 2008. And if a teacher works in Germany as an unqualified worker in the construction sector, that teacher can earn around 3600€⁹ for 2 months in 2008. However it should be noted that foreign workers are paid less than the native ones but generally earnings of foreign workers are not half of the earnings of native ones for the same job. Moreover some people who work in regions whose main economic activity is winter tourism may also work during the warmer periods of the year in another country temporarily. Similarly farmers can work during the winter when they just wait for their crops to grow, in other member states where they can get higher wages.

⁹ Calculation: 9€ per hour (Reuters, 2008) is paid for an unqualified worker in Germany in 2008. It has been assumed that the teacher will work for 8 weeks, 5 days in a week and 10 hours a day.

Another example of this type of migration is found with Lithuanians going to Sweden to work in the construction sector for a certain period of time. In order to compare, in Lithuania in 2008 the average annual earnings of somebody working in the education sector and of a construction worker is around 6800€ and 8500€ respectively while the annual earnings of a construction worker in Sweden in 2008 is around 34500€. As can be seen in these examples the wage differentials between both the same and different sectors play a crucial role in periodic migration. However these people prefer moving into other member states periodically because they earn in a high-wage region and spend their earnings in a low-wage region. Cost-benefit calculations are of great importance as well as border regions since people often prefer moving to neighboring high-wage regions in order to minimize the costs such as transportation, adaptation and psychological and social costs of moving. The main reason why these workers do not permanently move into these high-wage regions and transfer the money back home is that for periodic migrants staying with the family is much more important than for any other type of migrants in general. In addition to these examples, it is possible to find many other combinations of countries and sectors.

Consequently, for periodic migration, wage differentials, cultural and physical proximity are important factors. Even though Polish or Lithuanian people can go to the UK for temporary works, the majority of people still prefer moving to border regions. More importantly, the proximity of a prosperous region to the region of origin is the main pre-condition for periodic migration.

3.4 Lifestyle Migration

As continuously discussed by many authors, ageing population is a very big challenge for Europe to tackle. The increasing competition from Asian countries and the USA puts pressure on welfare systems of many EU member states on the one hand and on the other hand; elderly people try to find a way to keep their current well-being at the same levels by different means. One of the most efficient ways to sustain the high living standards is to move into another member state where the costs of living are lower. However, the main reason seems to be an economic one, there are many factors that affect the decision of movement of retired people. However lifestyle migration, in general, is not age-specific and such a phenomenon has also been partly analyzed in the micro level as individual preferences. Apart from macro and meso factors influencing people's decision on moving, their way of life and dreams are also influential which refers to lifestyle decisions. However, in this section, I would like to analyze lifestyle migration in an age-specific and narrow manner. I shall emphasize the lifestyle reasons of elderly people who would like to move into another EU member state. From this specific point of view, the motivations for elderly people can be listed as follows:

- Quality of life (slower and relaxed way of life)
- The climate and sun (health and relaxation)
- The culture and ties (respect for elderly people, safety)
- Cheap property (enabling early retirement)
- A business opportunity (To fund a better life)
- Closeness to home, and other ties and connections
- Desire to leave the home country (increasing number of immigrants, high crime rates etc.)
- Will to go somewhere 'you can be yourself' (O'Reilly, no date).

Such motivations are also important for people who would like to move to find a job in another EU country but in the case of young people, dreams are more

important than a relaxed life in a warm Mediterranean EU member state. For elderly and retired people, there are 2 groups of retired people who move into another EU member state:

- a- Those who move to another member state for work and then return home for retirement
- b- Those who retire in the home state and then move (Moro, 2006 & 2007)

For the people in the first group, yearning plays a crucial role while for the ones in the second group, economic concerns do. However, regardless of the main reason, the factors that push and pull retired people are exactly the same. To begin with, as discussed in the Theories of Migration chapter, in the micro level people act as economically rational individuals. For example a retired elderly person from a Nordic country will certainly increase his/her purchasing power after moving to Spain or Greece due to the lower prices. Also, the fiscal and tax policies of Nordic countries entails more budgetary pressure than that of Greece and Spain, which indirectly increase the incomes of retired migrants. Secondly, a warmer climate is more preferable for many Northern retired people to get a relaxed life and escape from hectic urban life, cold weather, illnesses and heating costs as well. Thirdly, the established networks also encourage retired people to move into warmer Mediterranean member states as discussed in network migration section. Apart from established networks, during their business life they go to southern member states for summer holidays and they learn about the countries and this becomes important when it comes to decide where to move. Lastly, in addition to previous factors, due to early retirement, some retired people create businesses in the markets of southern member states (O'reilley, no date).

Another important point in retirement migration is the people who worked in another member state and come back home after retirement. These people generally move into other member state for better career, living conditions etc. and when they are retired, they come back home because of yearning, concerns about welfare state benefits e.g. Swedes, as well as economical reasons.

In addition to positive aspect of southern member states, there are some factors that discourage people to move into these countries. It is hard to get involved in the local networks and to enjoy health and care provisions in another country due to legal arrangements by the EU and by national governments.

In conclusion, retirement migration is leading another type of migration which is called as lifestyle migration. It is likely that this type of migration will also be common among younger generations too.

4 Dynamics for Turkish Mobility

After analyzing the migration flow from new member states to old member states over a period of 5 years, it is easier to forecast the dynamics and density of Turkish migration after Turkey joins the European Union.

Labor Migration

As seen in the previous chapters, the structural indicators that are used to analyze the macro factors stimulating migration show that Turkey belongs to the Eastern European group of countries and even has worse conditions in some categories. The gap between EU15 and Turkey in terms of wages, purchasing power, unemployment etc. is likely to trigger a similar migration to the one from EU12 to EU15 after 2004. The structural indicators show that there is a big gap between EU15 and Turkey and this will also be a pre-condition for Turkish migrants to move after joining the EU. Unemployed or those who are unable to earn a living in Turkey will be pushed to migrate into the EU15 countries. Moreover, wage differentials will make the EU15 more attractive for Turks to move. However, depending upon the experiences after the enlargement rounds in 1987, 2004 and 2007, the density of migration will not be as high as expected now since in addition to the structural gap between Turkey and the EU15 there are many other factors that influence the decision of a prospective mover such as family and friends, and individual preferences as discussed above.

As seen in the last two enlargement rounds, the EU seems to be more experienced about the prospective migration from developing member states since some member states open their borders to labor force of new member states right after the enlargement even though some old member states still apply transitional rules. This change indicates a transformation in understanding the EU and about the new enlargement rounds. Another important point regarding prospective Turkish migration are the social networks because there are many Turks living in many different EU member states for years (see Table 3).

Table 3. Number of Turks in EU countries, 2002 (thousands)

Country	Total	Turkish Nationality	EU naturalized
Germany	2642	1912	730
France	370	196	174
Netherlands	270	96	174
Austria	200	120	80
Belgium	110	67	43
UK*	70	37	33
Denmark	53	39	14
Sweden	37	14	23
Total	3752	2481	1271

*Around 120.000 Turkish Cypriots are not included. Source: Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004

Most of these Turkish people or their families moved into these countries during the 1960s and early 1970s with guest-worker programs launched by the countries suffering from a lack of labor after the Second World War (Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004). This is why most of these Turkish people are not immigrants. However, this does not change the consequences of network migration. Many of these Turkish people still have relatives and friends in Turkey; which shall in turn trigger migration from Turkey to the EU15 through the social networks that have been established by the guest-workers from Turkey. However, transitional rules which will possibly be applied by Germany can change the direction of migration flow from Turkey to Germany. This may allow Turkish citizens to establish new social networks in other EU15 countries and migration into these countries can be much higher as in the example of Ireland, the UK, Spain and Italy. However it is not certain that Germany will not be the main destination for Turks again after the removal of transitional rules.

It is insufficient to assume that only unemployed or low-skilled people will migrate to the EU15 countries. The high-skilled workers will also move into the EU15 due to the reasons explained above such as better working conditions and

career opportunities. The young and educated adults will be the key group of people emigrating from Turkey. Considering the service sector is rapidly growing in Turkey, Turkish population is getting more educated to meet the needs of this growing sector. Since the unemployment rate among young college graduates, it is reasonable to expect a higher rate of immigration of young educated adults than unskilled labor force. For young adults, dreams will play a crucial role in the decision to move.


Another important point about migration flow from Turkey to member states is the increasing number of nationals of other developing countries. For example citizens of Algeria, Iran, and Tunisia are free to enter Turkey up to 90 days and the citizens of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Jordan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are allowed to obtain a visa at the borders for up to 30 days (Directorate General of Security of Turkey, 2010). Considering this, the migration flow from Turkey to the member states will not only include Turkish citizens but also some other nationals using Turkey as a transition country.

In general, the prospective Turkish migration will also reflect the complicated character of migration. The reasons for Turkish migration will be as diverse as today. The people will move to other member states because of unemployment, family ties, social networks, and individual interests etc. However, there will be a difference between where the high-skilled and low-skilled people are from considering the regional disparities within Turkey. Even though there will also be the low-skilled people moving from Western Turkey, the majority of high-skilled people will move from Western Turkey particularly from big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The low-skilled people will mainly migrate from Eastern Turkey since the guest-workers who moved into some of the member states were mostly from the villages of Middle and Eastern Anatolia. However, there is a considerable amount of unemployed people who have moved from rural regions to these big Turkish cities in recent decades to have better living conditions. Some of those unemployed people will also immigrate.

Circular Migration



For this type of migration, the proximity of a prosperous region to a relatively poor region from where people emigrate temporarily to enjoy the high wages is vital. When Turkey joins the EU, the neighboring member states around Turkey will not be much richer than Turkey and countries like Greece and Bulgaria will not be able to offer citizens of Turkey as good opportunities as Germany offers Polish people and Sweden offers Lithuanians at the present time. That is why it is unlikely that many citizens of Turkey will immigrate to neighboring regions periodically. In contrast, it is likely that some people from neighboring regions will immigrate periodically to Western Turkey; especially to Istanbul since Western Turkey is much richer than Eastern Turkey and some of the neighboring regions and countries such as Bulgaria. Even though the structural indicators show on the national level that Turkey has almost the same living conditions as most of the EU12 countries, Western regions of Turkey offer much better wages and conditions than some of the EU12 countries. To rationalize that it is needed to use some indicators at the regional level to see the differences within countries and how it can influence a possible periodic migration. In order to do that, two NUTS regions are analyzed in Turkey, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. In Figure 14, the NUTS 2 regions in Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are shown as the two nearest regions to Istanbul and Bursa that are much richer than the rest of Turkey.


Figure 14. The two nearest NUTS 2 regions to Istanbul and Bursa regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The region west of Istanbul is not as dynamic and rich as Istanbul and Bursa but also not poorer than the Greek and Bulgarian regions, which is why is out of interest of this paper.

Figure 15. A comparison in NUTS2 levels





As seen in figure 15, there is a considerable difference between different regions in different countries in the Balkans. Even though the unemployment rate does not tell so many things, the long-term unemployment figures indicate that in Greece, Bulgaria and Romania long term unemployment is a bigger problem than in Turkey. Moreover, within these countries the two nearest regions have a greater long-term unemployment rate.

Considering the dynamic structure of the Istanbul and Bursa regions, the long-term unemployment can play a role in backward migration so as to say a flow of people from Europe to Turkey. There is not reliable data on wages in different regions but assuming that the higher the GDP per capita in PPPs, the higher the wages, there can be a flow of people from Bulgaria and Romania to Turkey. Regarding periodic migration, it is realistic to assume that there will be backward migration since as economically rational individuals Romanians and Bulgarians would prefer moving to Turkey periodically to enjoy the higher wages. It should be kept in mind that such a gap in NUTS 2 level can also lead to labor migration (long term or permanent) from Europe to Turkey. As mentioned before, the prosperous neighboring region is crucial in determining the direction of periodic

migration since in this type of migration, proximity is very important. Consequently those Romanians and Bulgarians who would like to be close to their families and enjoy higher wages will move to Turkey periodically. It is hard to assume that citizens of Turkey will migrate to Greece to do periodic jobs since the differences between neighboring regions in Turkey and Greece are not so high. However the figures are from 2007 and at present time there are very big economic problems in Greece due to the financial crisis and these economic problems may change the conditions such as wages, unemployment rate, GDP per capita and lead to a gap between Turkey and Greece in the future and this may trigger periodic migration from Greece to Turkey.

Lifestyle Migration

Considering the fact that at the macro level on average the living costs are lower than in Greece and Spain, it is likely that many people from Northern member states will prefer moving into the coastal regions of Turkey. There are already many British and German citizens that moved into southern cities of Turkey after retirement. In addition to economical factors, at the meso level, this network will also attract many other EU citizens with the accession of Turkey to the EU since there will be no visa problem and the services will be according to European standards and easier to reach. And finally at the micro level, those who move into warmer member states as a lifestyle will move into Turkey. However, it is important to stress that when richer EU citizens come to coastal Turkey, the prices will also increase which may hinder such a trend in the long run. Moreover, rapidly improving conditions in warmer coastal regions in Turkey may increase the regional disparities within Turkey. The positive aspect of such a migration trend regarding employment is that elderly people will need health and house care and this will allow more young people to find a job. But such a need for employment will also be met by South-Eastern Turkey where the unemployment rate among young people is the highest.

In addition to EU citizens, some Turks who moved to EU member states such as Germany will also come back to their home country after retirement. Today,

there are some people who return to Turkey even if there is not sufficient data about them. But such a migration may change the profile of Turks in Europe. So as to say, the young Turks will move to Europe to find jobs while the elderly retired Turks will come back to Turkey.

5 Europe: A Dreamland for the Turkish Labor Force

The prospective movement of citizens of Turkey in the case of full membership is subject to more diverse and complicated dynamics than trying to explaining it by just referring to the assumption that millions Turkish citizens will migrate from poorer regions of Turkey to richer regions of Europe. However we have seen from the experiences of earlier enlargement rounds that the factors at micro, meso and macro levels are interrelated and interdependent. It has also been obvious that macro and meso factors create the pre-conditions rather than determining one's decision on movement. In the end the decision of movement within the EU is individual but these decisions are taken under the influence of macro and meso factors. That is why, both claim that millions of low-skilled or unemployed Turks will immigrate and that Turkish young movers will drive the European economy is unilateral and one-sided. Both of these arguments just reflect one of the results of prospective Turkish migration. Such generalizations lead many to underestimate the negative impact of this migration and to overestimate the positive impact of it or vice versa.

When it comes to labor migration regarding the citizens of Turkey, the macro factors such as wage differentials and meso factors such as family ties will create the necessary conditions and the decision of moving into a high-wage region, where people can earn more and obtain better career opportunities will be taken individually. This type of movement will constitute the bigger part of the Turkish-movers within the EU. Since it is hard to predict how political repression on minorities in Turkey will play a role in stimulating more migration it is not inconsistent to skip this factor. Even though the current stock of Turkish migrants in Europe will attract and open new ways for more migration, it is hard to tell that family ties will always cause emigration from Turkey. For example if a citizen of Turkey will have to leave family members to earn more or to get better living conditions, then the psychological and social impact of leaving can be

more dominant than earning more and the person may prefer staying. In contrast, especially for young people, the dreams are more important than family ties. Because of this, these young people may move within Europe regardless of existing Turkish migrant stock. That is why the profile of people moving from Turkey will be so diverse. While for the traditional and less-educated Turks the physiological and social costs of moving can also be high, for young and educated Turks, dreams will play a more crucial role in influencing the decision of moving. However as mentioned in previous chapters, the profile of educated Turks will also be diverse. Some of them will move to fulfill their dreams while some of them will move to work where they do not need their qualifications in order to have a better life. For example lawyers who cannot use their knowledge in Europe due to different legal systems may be in this category. Consequently the impact of different factors at different levels will differ for different people from different backgrounds.

Secondly, there will not be so many Turks moving within the EU periodically due to the fact that neighboring countries like Bulgaria and Greece do not offer great opportunities. However some Turks still move into Europe to do periodic jobs as Poles do in the UK even though the number of them will not be so large. This can be due to the low-cost flights which may decrease total costs of moving considerably. Moreover the periodic movement of students will also be important especially due to the increasing number exchange programs. However from the poorer regions of Bulgaria, Romania and also from Greece depending upon how the current financial crisis will affect its economy, there will be periodic migration to richer regions of Turkey such as Istanbul and Bursa. In addition such regional disparities in the Balkans may also create long-term or permanent labor migration from these countries to Turkey. Lastly, this type of migration will be more complicated if some other Balkan countries such as Croatia join the EU.

Thirdly, lifestyle migration will play a crucial role in the pattern of movement. Considering the lower living costs in Turkey than in Spain and Greece, it is likely that an important destination for elderly people will be Turkey. Considering the

fact that even today there are many Germans and Britons residing in southern Turkey, there will be more people coming from Northern Europe to Turkey. This type of migration will be further stimulated since today many young people also come to Turkey for holidays and learn about the country which may, in turn, influence their decision to move after retirement. In addition to EU citizens some elderly Turks who have already moved into the EU, will probably return to Turkey mostly after retirement. Even today, there are some Turks who went to Germany as guest workers during the 60s and returned to Turkey where they could have a more relaxed life and they can stop yearning.

As a result when Turkey, a country established to create a western society, becomes a member of the EU, the dreams of Turks will come true. All the citizens of Turkey will have the opportunity to get the life they dream with the great opportunities Europe will offer. In general, the dreams of people will be the driving force for Turkish mobility within the EU and Turks will be free to move into their dreamland.

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