The entry of gig-platforms to labor markets world-wide has caused significant frictions with national institutions and regulators, including trade unions. In this article, we compare the interactions between taxi and food delivery platforms with the industrial relations (IR) systems of Denmark and Sweden, where we observe isolated instances of unions striking collective agreements with platforms. We assess and compare platform strategies and interactions with IR system agents, using an RIT-framework (rulemaker-intermediary-ruletaker) which considers how rulemaking capacity is allocated within the Nordic IR systems. We detect both IR system evasion and integration in Denmark and Sweden, with significant variation in causes and mechanisms. We find that IR system integration can be explained by public backlash, pressure from IR system insiders, and gaining first-mover advantages. Our findings shed light on integrative mechanisms of the Nordic IR systems allowing us to identify and discuss future challenges posed by the platform economy. © 2022 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.

The impact of algorithmic systems on workers is a growing research topic in the fields of industrial relations and human resource management. However, extant research has largely neglected rapidly evolving and technologically advanced sectors where worker voice is strong, implying a significant and salient research gap. In contrast, we conduct a case study on technological bargaining in the highly unionized Swedish mining industry, offering findings that can address a noted puzzle in industrial relations research, namely the heterogeneity in strategies and outcomes among firms implementing algorithmic technologies. Drawing on 26 in-depth interviews and pertinent documents, we employ process tracing to analyze the drivers and determinants of collective bargaining on digital automation at the local level. Theoretical contributions include a multi-tier process model linking endogenous local power resources to exogenous meso- and macro-level power resources, influencing positive-sum versus zero- or negative-sum outcomes. Our paper highlights how the design of the Swedish industrial relations system can foster trust and influence the implementation of digital automation for the benefit to workers, firms, and society writ large.

We explore how the wage bargain is affected by employer concentration and labor market institutions in Sweden, using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration on hires and an outside occupation index to address concerns relating to market definition. The model attempts to separate the wage impact from exercising outside options (individual bargaining power) and from collective bargaining agreements (collective bargaining power). Holding value added constant, concentration has a modest negative impact on wage levels for white collar occupations, but a positive effect for blue collar occupations. The positive impact from concentration for blue collar workers is interesting and should generate more research on bargaining power dynamics in heterogeneous labor markets. The explanatory power of the model is largely driven by yearly occupational and regional fixed effects. Yearly changes of estimated fixed effects closely follow Sweden's centrally coordinated collective bargained yearly wage increases, validating the model's ability to separate individual from collective bargaining power. The strength of outside options thus approximates wage drift.

Introducing private firms to a labor market previously dominated by a single public employer should improve the wage bargain of workers; by breaking up a public monopsonist, demand-side competition for scarce labor inputs should lift wages closer to competitive rates. Here, I study how the wages and incomes of blue collar care workers and white collar nurses in Sweden are impacted when more employers are introduced as a result of welfare privatization, employing a wage-concentration model and a difference-in-difference event study model of privatization events, using detailed employer-employee matched administrative data. Employer concentration has a relatively strong negative effect on the wages and incomes of nurses, but a much smaller effect on care workers. Privatization events have no significant impact to nurses incomes, while care workers' incomes decrease by 11 to 12 percent. The results suggest heterogeneous effects from privatization based on worker skills; "lower skill" blue collar care workers have been adversely affected by privatization, whereas higher skill white collar nurses have not. The differences are likely rooted in sectoral collective bargaining agreement provisions.